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negligence (such as non-persons who were 
Hollywood stunt people, who didn't wear their 
seat-belts, or who botchErl their suicide 
attempts). This doesn't bother Wreen. In 
response to my having pointed out that "at 
most Wreen has made a case for the ascription 
of basic rights to those human non-persons 
whose condition is no fault of their own" (p. 
126). (The first two words are ernmasizErl 
because they were inadvertently omitted from 
Wreen's quotation in his response.) Wreen 
replies that it would be consistent with his 
position to hold that such non-persons have 
forfeited their right to life (WII: p. 26-7). 
I continue to find this counter-intuitive, 
but the reader must check his/her own intui-
tions on this point. 
11. In this context, Wreen also claims 
that such terms "are used metamorically by 
all those who reject (88) [Singer's "species-
ism"] and (FS) and, in fact, by everyone who 
employs the concept of a basic right at all" 
(WI: p. 57). However, (1) Why must a propon-
ent of basic rights personify change or na-
tural law? Only moral agents are capable of 
respecting or violating basic rights. (2) 
Rejectors of speciesism who endorse the no-
tion of basic rights also have no need thus 
to personify nature. In reiterating his 
"you, too" charge in "My Kind of Person, " 
Wreen actually makes a very different charge: 
he claims that anti-speciesists who accord 
moral considerability to non-humans anthropo-
morphize these non-humans. Why? By applying 
terms (moral and psychological) for which the 
adult human is the m:x:l.el to those who are 
non-human. In doing this, anti-speciesists 
use the terms in a "metamorical" or "deriva-
tive" sense (WII: n. 6). In response, I 
first want to point out that this would be a 
very different sort of metamorizing from 
that which Wreen has been chargErl with doing. 
Second, to say that any application of psy-
chological or moral terms to non-humans is 
anthrofXXllOrfhism is to say that it is cogni-
tively unjustifiErl. But why should one ac-
cept this allegation? Even if "Wittgenstein 
has taught us" that the adult human is the 
model for all psychological and moral ascrip-
tions (I happen to be one of those fhiloso-
. mers who have not been "taught" this by 
anybody, including Wittgenstein), it does not 
follow that the application of such terms to 
others is cognitively unjustified or meta-
morical. 8uppose that I learn the concept 
of box on the basis of my exposure to cigar 
boxes. Do I "cigarboximorphize" if, later in 
life, I classify music boxes as boxes? Is 
this a cognitively unjustified ascription? 
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lImong the many ways in which human 
beings differ from animals, two are especial-
ly evident in philosomic debate. I'm not 
talking about rationality here; the rather 
hard to understand objections of a few aside, 
rationality is so evident as not to merit 
mention. No, I'm referring, first, to the 
inability of a milosomer to entertain a 
doubt that anything he/she ever wrote is or 
could be wrong, and, second, his/her willing-
ness to defend unto the death, in the form of 
replies and counter-replies, every single 
word he/she's ever cOllIllitted to the page. 
Evelyn Pluhar and I, I am afraid, are very 
much cases in point. Here we are, going at 
it again, this being the second journal and 
the fifth article in the series. Maybe, if 
we're lucky, we can sell the whole thing as a 
television serial. 
But let me get down to business now, in 
an effort to keep round five as short as 
possible. 
The story so far has been: I write "In 
Defense of 8peciesism," [1] arguing that all 
creatures belonging to a species character-
ized by personhood have a right to life--
basically, all human beings have a right to 
life~ Pluhar responds in "Speciesism Not 
Justified, " [2 ] arguing that my arcJument is 
defective on many counts; I reply in "My Kind 
of Person, " [3 ] arguing that Pluhar' s criti-
cisms won't do; Pluhar does not take this 
lying down but responds yet again in· "Spe-
ciesism Revisited, "[4] defending her earlier 
objections against my counter-arguments. 
That brings us up to the present. In 
this paper, I won't be recapitUlating any 
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more of the blow-by-blow story of rounds one 
through four than necessary. (All of the 
recapitulation needed to orient the reader 
can be found in "My Kind of Person" and 
"Speciesisrn Revisited.") In replying to 
Pluhar's latest, then, I'll try to be brief 
and, as I did in "My Kind of Person," skip 
over lots of minor objections. 
I 
Pluhar continues to try to rough up my 
identification principle: 
(IP) : It is a necessary truth that 
the statement "X is a human being" 
is g<Xld evidence for the statement 
"X is a hum3Il person." 
said in "In Defense of Speciesisrn" that 
(IP) was plausible but, because of space 
limitations, offered as a defense of it only 
that it is related to another extremely plau-
sible principle, a reidentification princi-
ple: 
(RI): It is a necessary truth that 
bodily identity is g<Xld evidence 
for personal identity. 
Pluhar still doesn't think (IP) is so re-
lated, or that, even if it were, it's at all 
plausible. Let me take these charges in 
turn. 
Charge one: Pluhar claims that it's 
possible to hold (RI) without holding (IP) 
because, she says, it's possible to conceive 
of detennining who or what is a person on 
purely empirical--that is, non-criteriologi-
cal--grounds. She notes that, after all, I 
accept Feinberg's notion of personh<Xld (ac-
tually, I don't, but that's another story i I 
merely gestured in Feinberg's direction in a 
friendly way in "In Defense of Speciesisrn" in 
order to simplify matters), and on that con-
cept of personhood, who is a person is a 
purely empirical matter. For the sake of 
argument, then, let's say that we've deter-
mined on purely empirical grounds that this 
prrticular hurran being, Walter Weber, is a 
person. Now that Weber has been determined 
to be a person, she continues, "we may hold 
that the relationship between [Walter Weber] 
and this particular body is not purely empir-
ical," and so accept (RI). That is to accept 
(RI) without accepting (IP), since, in the 
story told, the determination of personh<Xld 
in general--and Walter Weber's in particular 
--involves no crlteriological principles at 
all, and certainly not (IP). ( IP ), then, is, 
my claim and argument to the contrary not-
withstanding, not presupposed by (Rr). 
This won't do. The mere fact thac: Fein-
berg's list of properties characteristic of 
personh<Xld contains no criteriological prin-
ciples doesn't show that none links humanity 
and personhood or that none was involved in 
attributing personhood to Mr. Weber or that 
anyone who accepts Feinberg's characteriza-
tion must think that the determination of 
personhood is "a purely empirical matter," 
i.e., involves no criteriological principles. 
To illustrate the point here with an analo-
gous case, let's take pain--to pull one char-
acteristic off Feinberg's list itself--is 
definable, and not just characterizable, as 
that ouch, or ouch-like, sensation. Still, 
the attribution of pain may be, in fact prob-
ably is, criteriologically connected to pain 
behavior. The same holds, I would say, with 
personhood and hurranity. The point here, in 
short, is that the mere fact that a defini-
tion or characterization of a concept is in 
tenTIS of properties x, y, and z does not show 
that the concept is not criteriologically 
connected to sane other concept. Thus, the 
rrove fran "this is how personh<Xld is correct-
ly characterized (or defined)" to "the deter-
mination of personh<Xld is a purely empirical 
matter" is a move that cannot be automatical-
ly made. Certainly, it looks as if it 
shouldn't be made at all, as one of the 
characteristics on Feinberg's list, a psycho-
logical one, namely pain, is criteriological-
ly related to sanething else, a characteris-
tic not on his list, namely pain behavior, 
and all of the characteristics on his list 
are psychological ones. But even if this 
particular strong objection is not pressed 
against Pluhar, she does make just the infer-
ential move in question, and does so without 
any justification at all, in her story about 
accepting (RI) but not (IP). To do so is 
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simply to beg the question at issue, since it 
is to assume without argument that the con-
cept of a human being is not criteriological-
ly connected to that of a person. 
But, that objection also aside, I have 
trouble with holding that the relation be-
tween this particular person (Walter Weber) 
and this particular body is not purely empir-
ical, after detennining that Walter is a 
person on purely empirical grounds. The 
temporal "after" can't be taken at face value 
here; it must be true from the start that 
there is some sort of necessary connection 
between the person and his/her (human, we're 
assuming) body over time--but, to complete 
the story, none at anyone time! That 
doesn't sound coherent to me. If the dia-
chronic identity of a person is conceptually 
caught up with the existence of his/her body, 
his/her synchronic identity must be as well. 
It would be rrore than odd otherwise, since 
the diachronic is simply the synchronic 
stretched out, so to speak. 
II 
But even if (IP) is presupposed by (RI), 
so much the worse for (RT), thinks Pluhar. 
Why? Because (IP) is itself false, or at 
least highly implausible. In "Speciesism Not 
Justified," she says that "it is easy enough 
to imagine a world in which 'X is alive 
human being' is not good evidence for 'X is a 
human person'" (p. 123), and I cormnented that 
I supposed 
that what she has in mind ••• are 
worlds in which all, or at least 
many of the human beings born in it 
are brain damaged, or retarded, or 
suffer some mental failing that 
precludes personhood•••• Arguing 
by inductive enumeration in such a 
world, Pluhar would say (I'm sup-
tosing) "X is a live human being" 
dOes not inductively warrant "X is 
a human person" ("My Kind of Per-
son," p. 24-25). 
True enough, I said in reply, but not to the 
point, for all such considerations really 
show is that the evidential weight that (IP) 
speaks of is simply overridden in such cases, 
that the conclusion that X is a human person 
cannot be drawn straightaway. That doesn't 
show that the evidential weight isn't there 
at all or that (IP) is false. What it does 
show is that the (bizarre) principle that it 
is a necessary truth that being a live human 
being is sufficient empirical evidence for 
being a human person is false. 
I find Pluhar's response to this puzz-
ling. She says that "Wreen responds by 
agreeing that we can imagine the evidential 
relationship not to hold but denying that 
this shows (IP) false." That is simply not 
so. I do deny that anything I said shows 
(IP) false, but nowhere do I claim that I can 
imagine cases in which the evidential rela-
tionship (IP) speaks of doesn't obtain. Cer-
tainly none is provided by me, nor do 
anywhere say they are in the offing. All I 
say is that worlds in which all, or alrrost 
all, human beings are not persons are con-
ceivable. That doesn't show that being a 
live human being is not good evidence for 
being a human person in those worlds, only 
that such evidence as it does provide isn't 
sufficient to carry the day. 
Continuing her attack, Pluhar quotes my 
remark: 
All inductive principles, even the 
best of them, and even criteriolo-
gical principles, may have to give 
way in particular circumstances in 
the face of evidence to the contra-
ry ("My Kind of Person," p. 25), 
and--I think that this is what she is doing, 
anyway--tries to convict me of inconsistency. 
She says that the remark won't do because: 
it is part of the concept of cri-
terion that if x is criteriologic-
ally related to y, there is no 
evidence that would count as show-
ing that x is not good evidenc'i'! for 
y. This is what distinguishes a 
criteriological claim from an em-
pirical one. 
She's surely right about that. Hence, given 
the quoted remark fran "My Kind of Person," I 
am inconsistent, or, better still, should 
just say that human bodies and persons are 
not related criteriologically. 
No doubt I'm at least partly responsible 
for the misunderstanding here, given the 
wording of that quoted remark. Still, its 
sense is clear enough in context, and the 
position taken anything but inconsistent. 
For, when I write that all inductive princi-
ples, and even criteriological ones, may have 
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to give way in particular circumstances in 
the face of evidence to the contrary, it is 
evident that what is being said is that the 
inductive principle enshrined in a criterio-
logical principle--whether mine or one about 
the relation of pain behavior to pain or 
whatever--is what gives way, with "gives way" 
being understood in the sense that the pre-
sence of the first property (e.g., pain beha-
vior) is not sufficient for an attribution of 
the presence of the second property (e.g., 
pain). This is to say only that the relation 
is not one of inductive sufficiency, even if 
it is one of good evidence. Think of what I 
say in relation to a criteriological princi-
pIe relating pain behavior and pain, if no 
other example comes immediately to mind. 
Worlds in which everyone who is in pain acts 
stoically and everyone who exhibits pain 
behavior is faking it don't show that "it is 
a necessary truth that 'x exhibits pain beha-
vior' is good evidence for 'X is in pain'" is 
false. Thus, I certainly agree with Shoema-
ker's remark, quoted by Pluhar against me, 
that 
A test of whether sanething is one 
of the criteria for judgments of a 
certain kind is whether it is con-
ceivable that we might discover 
empirically that it is not, or has 
ceased to be, evidence in favor of 
the truth of such judgments. [5] 
III 
still another objection lodged by plu-
har, and one which continues to impress her, 
is that my argument is inherently dependent 
on a personification of nature. She notes 
that I use all sorts of personifying terms in 
my original article (see "speciesisrn Revisi-
ted" for a sampling of relevant quotations 
fran "In Defense of Speciesisrn") and contends 
that I cannot get along without them. So, to 
quote myself--for the objection was first 
raised by me in "In Defense of Speciesisrn"--
isn't my conceptual framework incoherent? 
No, I replied, for the personification is 
simply a convenient and vivid way of speak-
ing, and one that helps drive my point home. 
All personifying terms are extirpable, I 
said. Pluhar disagrees: they aren't, she 
thinks, though originally she didn't say why 
and didn't attempt to read or rewrite the 
gist of the argument without any personifying 
tenus. Instead, she responds to my remark 
that all that needs be done to rennve the 
unwanted terms is to read "In Defense of 
Speciesisrn" without them or to read "My Kind 
of Person" as it stands with the claim that 
the conclusion of my original argument itself 
is laden with such terms and that since the 
conclusion of that argument is repeated in 
"My Kind of Person," the same holds for it. 
The personifying I indulge in is, supposedly, 
thereby shown to be inextirpable. 
This can't be right as it stands. The 
conclusion of my argument is that all members 
of a species characterized by personhood have 
a right to life, and no personifying term 
occurs in that statement. What Pluhar means 
is that the fourth stage of my argument, 
especially as encapsulated, without explana-
tion, in the abbreviated s1..1I!mary of that 
stage, includes at least one personifying 
term. That it does, namely in the pu-ase 
"equality of opportunity:" 
(4) Human non-persons, then, should 
be ascribed basic rights;for al-
though in the primary case it is 
persons who are ascribed basic 
rights, equality of opportunity, or 
better, fairness, requires us to 
ascribe basic rights to human non-
persons as well. ("In Defense of 
Speciesisrn," p. 52) 
But can I get by without personification? 
That's what's really at issue. Sure, by 
reading "In Defense of Speciesisrn" and "My 
Kind of Person" in the way previously indica-
ted--and that means no more than reading the 
relevant portions of each as indicated. I 
don't really think that's so hard. 
As for why the justice or equality prin-
ciple, 
All creatures in the relevant (per-
son-related) class are to be treat-
ed fairly and equally in respect to 
personhood generated rights ( "My 
Kind of Person," p. 27), 
srnuld be accepted in the first place, I 
don't think that a defense is needed at all--
not for that principle, given that everyone 
holds that all persons have a right to life. 
Saneone like Michael Tooley, [6] for example, 
or Joel Feinberg[7] could accept it--would 
have to accept it, on pain of not being fair 
or just--even though both think that only 
persons have a right to life, that the rele-
vant person-related class is that of persons. 
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Indeed, anyone who ascribes a right to life 
to persons at all has to accept it, despite 
the fact that there is great controversy over 
whether personhood is the only ground for 
ascribing personhood generated rights or 
basic rights. The m:>re pressing questions I 
face really are, "Why is the relevant class 
that of humans?" and "Do I defend the view 
that it is humans in an inherently metaIJhori-
cal way?" 
To answer the second question first: 
not at all. My defense of my view--and that 
comprises essentially the whole of "In De-
fense of Speciesism"--is primarily non-meta-
phorical, and even in the section in which 
metaphorical terms do oc=, non-metaphorical 
ones do as well, interspersed am:>ng metar:nor-
ical ones, and are used to make precisely the 
same points (see "In Defense of Speciesism, 
p. 53).[8] As for question one: sufficeit 
to say that my view is defended basically on 
the grounds (l) that everyone agrees that 
personhood is a sufficient condition for the 
ascription of a right to life, (2) that per-
sonhood is metaphysically caught up with 
humanity in the world we have, (3) that em-
pirical conditions of both a general and 
particular sort cirewnscribe personhood in 
this world, even if not in every possible 
one, and (4) that when those conditions are 
not met in the case of any particular human 
being, it is through no fault of his/her own 
(in the great rna. jority of cases) • If we 
assume (if only for the sake of argument) 
that, other things being equal, personhood is 
the only ground for the ascription of basic 
rights, the equality/justice principle would, 
in an ideal world, tell us that the "relevant 
(person-related) class" is that of persons 
alone. But, as evidenced by (1)-(4) above, 
m:>st of "In Defense of Speciesism" is geared 
to tell us why the class should not be so 
restricted in the world we've got. There's 
nothing metaphorical about that. 
Circularity is Pluhar's last charge 
against me, just as it was in her earlier 
paper. To her earlier objection that the 
argument of "In Defense of Speciesism" was 
circular because it assumed that all human 
beings have a right to be treated equally, in 
an effort to prove that all humans have that 
right (along with other basic rights, includ-
ing the one of interest in the paper, the 
right to life), I had responded that there 
was no circle because equality as a right was 
not invoked, only equality as a principle. 
But, contends Pluhar in "Speciesism Revisi-
ted, that just changes the location of the 
circle, for "to suppose, as Wreen does, that 
the [equality] principle [stated above] ap-
plies to human non-persons is to presuppose 
that membership in a species characterized by 
personhood has m:>ral weight [I think that she 
means "has a right to life" here, though]." 
Thus the circle is "not only. • not bro-
ken, it has tightened into a noose for the 
argument." 
Little need be said in reply to this, 
given what has been said above. The princi-
ple presupposes no such thing; as it stands, 
it is acceptable to--in fact, needs be em-
braced by--everyone who ascribes basic rights 
on the basis of personhood, and it is argued 
at length that human beings are one such 
person-related class--that is really what the 
whole of "In Defense of Speciesism" is an 
argument for. 
v 
In academic circles these days, species-
ists like myself are more often shouted down, 
stmmarily dismissed, sneered at, entirely 
ignored, or called nasty names than paid 
attention to and argued with. I thank Evelyn 
Pluhar, then, for her critical comnents on 
"In Defense of Speciesism" and "My Kind of 
Person." The attention itself is gratifying, 
and the opportunity to clarify and explain my 
position at greater length welcane. [9] I do 
think, though, that it is time for Pluhar and 
I to call it quits. Five is about as high as 
I care to count. 
I hope that readers now understand what 
it is I have been arguing, and why I think 
that speciesism, in the restricted sense of 
the terms I've been employing, is justifi-
able. Nothing I've said commits me to hold-
ing that all, or even most, of what human 
beings do to animals is justifiable. And, 
indeed, I think that a large portion of it 
isn't. But I do think that, in the world we 
inhabit, the claims that species differences 
are m:>rally irrelevant, that species member-
ship is about as m:>rally important a consi-
deration as distance fran Istanbul, that 
discrimination between two individuals on the 
basis of species membership is akin to dis-
crimination on the basis of race (that is, 
racism) or discrimination on the basis of sex 
(i.e., sexism)--that those and all such 
claims of a like sort are radically mistaken. 
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In "In Defense of Speciesism" and "My Kind of 
Person, " I concentrate on one important set 
of differences between humans and other ani-
mals, a set of differences which binds human-
ity together but ties us to no animals, and I 
argue that the difference is significant 
enough, in the mortal realm we're stuck with, 
to argue a right to life for all humans, 
irrespective of their mental developnent, and 
irrespective of the rights, if any, of ani-
mals. But there are many, many more differ-
ences than I point out there. The human 
family is marked off from other families by 
numerous properties, rrany of them relational 
in the strict sense of the term, and even 
ClOre relational in a looser sense, the sense 
in which the considerations pointed out in 
"In Defense of Speciesism" are relation-
al. [10] Thus, although I agree with conte.'Tl-
porary, academic anti-speciesists about many 
things and think that humans I treabnent of 
. animals is, by and large, deplorable, I can 
only urge them to attend to more than the 
small number of facts about humans and ani-
mals that they do (these chiefly being facts 
about the mental life of individual creatures 
at a particular time), and to remember that 
there are bigger pictures to consider than 
creatures in isolation. Some of them are 
IlIUch bigger pictures, involving as they do 
the nature of the world and humans' --and 
animals'--possibilities for realizing value 
in it. An ethic which takes such matters 
into account is a stronger ethic, because a 
more realistic one (in the strictest sense of 
the term), and an ethic which, practically 
speaking, leads to much the same conclusions 
as anti-speciesists want to secure anyway. 
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